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This is my version of a paper published in Philosophical Studies 151/3, 
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when quoting or citing  
 
Wedgwood¶V The Nature of Normativity is an impressive contribution to 
metaethics, imaginative, painstaking, original and extremely scholarly. 
But while I am highly impressed, I confess myself wholly unconvinced. 
In what follows I try to outline some reasons for my failure to be 
persuaded. 
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In a galaxy far far away, there is a planet called µ8J¶8J is 
inhabited by just two species of animal, Uggles and Huggles. The 
Huggles are pretty simple creatures. They GRQ¶W go in for language and 
can be credited with at best the most rudimentary forms of conceptual 
thought, intentionality or any of that stuff. But they are conscious 
creatures. They suffer and feel pain and do so in response to disease, 
physical trauma etc. just as do other more familiar creatures. The 
Uggles on the other hand are more like us, in this respect at least: they 
have the whole panoply of language and conceptual thought. They are 
also however a lot less nice than even the nastiest of us. Their 
predominant psychological feature is sadism directed at Huggles. What 
Uggles are mostly into doing is inflicting pain on Huggles as much and 
as often as they can. They GRQ¶W get some tangible benefit from making 
Huggles suffer the way, say, lions do from killing zebras. ,W¶VMXVW 
something they love to do. They are careful to refrain from anything 
that would risk wiping the Uggles out as that would leave them with no 
constituency for their sadism and render their lives, in their own eyes, 
lacking in purpose or meaning. For so central to their lives is their 
passion for inflicting suffering on Huggles that it dominates their 
practical, normative thought and centrally informs their understanding 
of what is desirable or choiceworthy. Thus there is nothing they consider 
more admirable in other Uggles than exhibitions of prowess in  
 and dedication to the practice of Huggle-torturing. Such sadistic 
convictions are entirely normal among Uggles and are perfectly stable 
for them under the most searching reflective scrutiny. 
We may not much like Uggles but we could surely understand 
them. Cognitively they are in respectable shape: their perceptual 
apparatus and capacity for epistemic rationality work OK. And they are 
competent enough at the sort of procedural rationality they need to 
adopt means adequate to their dreadful ends. So while their conception 
of what is choiceworthy and desirable is crazy by our lights, they remain 
intelligible to us as intentional systems speaking something we can 
recognize as a language. 7KH\¶re not too bad at the true but, by our lights, 
they are rubbish at the good. 
And indeed, by a wonderful cosmic coincidence, it turns out 
the language they speak looks strikingly like English. In this language 
they would say things like:  
 
You ought to bash that Huggle harder. It will hurt him more. and 
 
We ought not to attack those Huggles. There are others around here 
who are much more sensitive to pain. 
 
Now there was once an Uggle philosopher whose name was 
Ralph Ugwood (of the University of Ugford) who wrote a book whose 
name, by another wonderful cosmic coincidence, was The Nature of 
Normativity. In his book Ugwood offered a conceptual role semantics 
for µµRXJKW¶¶ whereby µ$ ought to ݊¶ is a proposition the truth of which 
would make it correct for A to plan to ݊. Correctness is a property that 
applies essentially to mental states and plays a regulative role in 
reasoning. Thus, for example, there are certain standards of correctness 
that apply to various kinds of mental states and these standards draw 
their authority from the ultimate purpose or point of the kind of state in 
question. Thus the point of the standards that govern belief  is  truth, 
while those of  those that  govern desire and  choice  are desirability 
and choiceworthiness (or simply, we might naturally say, goodness), 
these being essential features of belief, desire and choice. The capacities 
to have mental  states  of  various  kinds,  and  indeed  to  possess 
concepts  are  essentially rational dispositions, dispositions to respond 
to real normative features of oQH¶VDQWHFHGent mental states in forming 
news ones in essentially rational ways. That mental states respond in 
this way to normative features of other mental states shows that the 
normative features are real, causally efficacious features of the world. 
They may be realized in natural features of the world but they are not 
(Ugwood proceeds to argue) reducible to them. 
 Because the dispositions constitutive of the capacities to have 
various kinds of mental states are essentially rational we Uggles 
(Ugwood urged) must think of them as reliable  indicators of the  truth 
of the  normative  propositions to  which they respond, of which 
antecedent mental states make it likely to be correct to respond in one 
way and not in another. The normative intuitions by which we 
determine what is  or  is  not  choiceworthy or  good  are  either  
manifestations  or  simulations of dispositions that are essentially 
rational indicators of the facts about choicewor- thiness and goodness, 
sensitive to real normative features of our antecedent mental states in 
virtue of which certain choices and desires are likely to be correct. Thus 
suppose I, Ugwood, admire Professor Ugbad who shows particular 
inventiveness in devising novel ways to inflict unspeakable pain  on 
Huggles. The disposition I manifest here is the disposition essential to 
the capacity for the mental state in question, admiration. Given this, 
then my admiration is a reliable indicator, in normal  circumstances,  
assuming  my  beliefs  about  8JEDG¶V inventiveness  are correct, that 
8JEDG¶V actions really are admirable. 
Only of course they DUHQ¶W UgbaG¶VDFWLRQV are hateful and 
cruel, neither admirable nor choiceworthy. And 8JZRRG¶V intuitions 
about what is choiceworthy and admirable are not responses to real 
normative properties of choiceworthiness and admirableness. For the 
properties to which these intuitions respond are not really 
choiceworthy or admirable but appalling. Moreover it is not an essential 
feature of, say, choice, that it responds to and is regulated by 
choiceworthiness. For the choices of Uggles do not and are not. But 
they are certainly choices. 
Now back to Earth where there are no Uggles or Huggles, just us 
Muggles. Ralph Wedgwood is a Muggle philosopher whose first order 
normative views are far more civilized than are UgwooG¶VEXW whose 
metaethical take on them is really rather similar. ,¶P not sure what 
Wedgwood would say about the  planet Ug and its disagreeable 
denizens. Perhaps Uggles have normative concepts, concepts quite 
different  from  our  own  but  their  normative  concepts  are  deeply  
defective, essentially  dependent  on  mistaken  normative  beliefs.  But  
:HGJZRRGGRHVQ¶WEHOLHYH there can be concepts that are defective in 
this way. Thus it is not a defect in the concept µµZLWFK¶¶ that there are no 
witches as we see when we reflect that there is nothing defective in our 
thought, involving that very concept, that there are no witches. (pp. 
172±173) Perhaps then Uggles are deploying some distinct concept, 
say choiceworthyUggle   but the concept as such is not defective as is 
seen when we apply it in the nondefective thought that what is 
choiceworthyUggle  is not choiceworthy at all. But for this to be true 
 Ugwood must be deeply mistaken in thinking choiceworthinessUggle  a 
normative concept which enjoys essentially its role in rationally guiding 
action by some regulative principle whereby if something is 
choiceworthy then it is correct to choose it. For our own understanding 
of this concept accords it no such regulative authority. 
So are the Uggles¶ concepts of choiceworthiness, admirableness 
etc. just our own concepts,  as  Wedgwood  understands  them,  applied  
in  systematically  mistaken ways? I GRQ¶W see how they can be because 
the dispositions Uggles manifest in applying them are not essentially 
rational, do not respond to any facts about what it is correct to choose 
and admire, because the things Uggles are disposed to choose and 
admire are not things it is correct to choose and admire. Nor can it be 
proposed that circumstances are not normal or that Uggles intuitions are 
not in reflective equilibrium. For ex hypothesi they are perfectly 
normal (for Uggles) and perfectly stable under reflective scrutiny. (Of 
course they are only normal relatively locally, vis a`  vis the rational 
denizens of Ug, but it would be odd to view their status as such as 
compromised by the existence of us very differently thinking creatures 
located at the other end of the universe.) 
But it would be philosophically advantageous to understand 
these Uggles concepts as our own mistakenly applied. For that allows 
us to make the clearest sense of the thought that the Uggles and 
ourselves disagree about what is good, admirable, choiceworthy and are 
not merely thinking at cross purposes when they assert, for example, 
that torturing Huggles is admirable and we that it is not. So it would be 
good to be able to recognize this while continuing to insist that Uggle 
intuitions about what is choiceworthy, admirable, good are not 
responses to real normative properties of choiceworthiness and 
admirableness, goodness. 
They are certainly responses to something. It is perhaps most 
natural to say they are responses to, let us say, goodnessUggle  where 
by that I mean being such as to speak to the normative sensibilities of 
Uggles. But of course the concept of goodnessUggle   is  not,  when  I  
speak  of  it,  a  normative  concept  at  all:  it  lacks altogether the tie to 
motivation that is (Wedgwood and I agree) distinctive of the normative. 
That something is goodUggle in no way disposed me to desire or 
admire it or to think it would be correct for anyone to do so. Nor is 
goodnessUggle, according to me, the concept Uggles themselves 
employ when they speak of goodness. For when they speak of goodness 
they express their normative sensibilities and do not merely ascribe to 
the things of which they speak the natural property of speaking to it. 
There is no need to clutter up our metaphysics with any distinctively 
normative properties answering to this concept. An expressivist account 
 of their normative language is all we need to make sense of what they 
are up to. And all we need to make sense of what we are up to. 
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Wedgwood devotes a chapter to expressivism. And with good 
reason. Expressivists can agree with Wedgwood and Ugwood that 
normative concepts are concepts that play the role of regulating thought 
and action in ways that are essential to an understanding both  of  
normative  concepts and  of  thought. Expressivism about normative 
concepts is extremely well suited to furnish a neat explanation of the 
truth of normative judgement internalism, a theoretical desideratum 
Wedgwood heavily stresses and which drives much of the argument 
both for his own view and against other rival views. For Wedgwood 
normative concepts are essentially concerned to regulate our thought 
and action and normative properties are those properties to which we 
respond in thinking and acting in ways so regulated. An embarassment 
for his view is just how little, apart from this, he is able to tell us about 
these properties. On completing his book the reader knows of these 
properties that they are properties such that if we are rational we will 
recognize that it is frightfully important we shape our thoughts and 
actions with a view to their having the  positive normative  properties 
and lacking the  negative  ones. But  she LVQ¶WDQ\Zhere near  as clear  
why this is so very important  or what precisely  these properties are. 
The expressivist avoid this embarrassment by relating a metaethical 
account of normativity in which no such properties fundamentally 
feature. 
But Wedgwood thinks the expressivist has grounds for 
embarrassment of his own. His central concern arises from his demand 
that: µµWKH fundamental explanation of the meaning of a normative 
statement must provide some account of these conditions   or   
standards   of   justification   and   warrantedness.¶¶ (pp.   49±50) 
Acknowledging that  Gibbard in particular says rather  a lot  that  
speaks to this demand, he goes on however to complain: 
 µµ«LW is not clear that it is enough for an account of the meaning of 
normative statements simply to enumerate the standards of justification 
and warranted- ness that these statements are subject to. Consider an 
agent who is agonizing about a normative question. For example, 
suppose that she is agonizing over the  question of  whether  she  ought 
to  inform the  police  about  a  IULHQG¶VFULPLQDO activities. In agonizing 
about the question she is striving to reach an answer to this question 
that is justified and warranted. But why should she bother agonizing 
 over this. What is the point of going to so much trouble? What would 
be so bad about reaching an answer to the question that is not justified 
and warranted?¶¶ (p. 50) 
 
I myself think GibbarG¶V contribution to our understanding of 
normative justification and warrant rather too deep and impressive to be 
fairly characterized as a mere enumeration of anything. But I will focus 
here on the rhetorical questions with which the quoted passage ends. 
Unlike Wedgwood, I GRQ¶W think these questions need embarrass the 
expressivist. For an expressivist, normative judgements express our 
normative sensibilities where these are fundamentally constituted not by 
a body of beliefs but by the passions in our souls. It is not a puzzle why 
it is agonizing when these passions conflict and why we should be 
interested in resolving such conflict. Stella cares about having stable 
and close relationships with other people shaped by strong norms of 
personal loyalty. She cares in particular about this friendship she enjoys 
with Simon and does not want to damage it by departing from such 
loyalty. And she cares about Simon. It distresses her to think of him 
going through the hardship and humiliation of arrest, conviction and 
perhaps imprisonment. But she cares about other stuff too. She knows 
Simon has hurt and injured someone in some serious and unlawful way 
and she is invested in ideals of justice and the rule of law that represent 
it as her duty to bring what he has done to the attention of the 
authorities. So she is torn by conflicting passionate concerns and seeks 
a resolution of that conflict. A satisfying resolution will likewise be one 
that speaks to the passions in her soul. She would like to make a 
decision about what to do that she can justify to herself and others. Thus 
she would like to make a decision that will conform as well as it can to 
those of her concerns and commitments she is most confident will be 
stable under reflection so that her choice will be one she can 
subsequently live with. And she would like to make a decision she can 
justify to others, to her other friends, her family, her fellow citizens, to 
Simon himself, ideally at least, where that justification will speak to 
concerns and commitments she shares with these others. These are the 
kinds of pressures that operate on her to make her care that her decision 
is justified and warranted in terms of the normative commitments, 
particular and general, local and global, higher and lower order, to 
which such justification would speak. When we understand these facts 
about her, her concern that her decision have some justification is not 
exactly mysterious. Justification is simply the bringing to bear of 
normative judgements on whatever we are seeking to justify and we 
care about normative judgements, according to us expressivists, 
because normative judgement just is caring, or a species of caring. 
Expressivism need not of course say that these passions in her soul are 
 what provide 6WHOOD¶V reasons.1 But they are what her talk of reasons 
expresses and they explain why she finds reasons so very interesting. 
Inhabiting as she does the space of reasons her passions have shaped for 
her, she understands as clearly as she needs to, in their light, why the 
task of justifying her decisions and actions has the urgency it does. Not 
only, then, do we have a grip on why, causally and psychologically, 
Stella should care about making a decision that is justified; we can also 
obtain a grip on why, normatively speaking, she should do so. So I 
GRQ¶W think expressivism is too gravely  embarrassed  explaining  why  
we  should  bother  with  justification  and warrant. And ,¶P not at all 
sure why the realist is himself so free of such embarrassment. For the 
realist like Wedgwood who accepts normative judgement internalism, 
facts about justification and other normative facts are certainly facts in 
which rational people necessarily take an immense interest. But why 
that should be so is not entirely clear.2 
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I turn finally to Wedgwood¶V discussion of normative 
epistemology. I have argued elsewhere that one strength of 
expressivism is that it is peculiarly well suited to make sense of 
normative intuitions and the significance we accord them.3 But how 
does WedgwRRG¶V realist account fare? He notes the standard anti-
realist complaint that: 
 
Many realists say little more than that we have some cognitive 
faculty² sometimes called µµLntuition¶¶ or µµUHDVRQ¶¶ or conscienceµµ²
which enables us to come to know and have justified belief in 
normative propositions; but the rarely give an account of how this 
alleged faculty operates, or how it could serve as a reliable source of 
knowledge, or what could justify us in relying on it.¶¶ (p. 225) 
 
He claims to show however that µµUealism can provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the epistemology of normative beliefs¶¶ (p. 
226) I remain unconvinced. 
His account like many others accords a central place to 
normative intuitions. He seeks to vindicate the reliability of these by 
regarding them as manifestations or simulations of dispositions that are 
essentially rational. It is, he argues, µµD crucial«DVVXPStion of many 
psychological explanations that we often form a belief or other attitude 
precisely because our antecedent mental states make it rational for us 
                                                          
1
 Blackburn 1998, Gibbard, 1990. 
2
 Lenman 2009, esp. pp. 9-10. 
3
 Lenman 2007. 
 to do.¶¶S 246)  Reflection on  the  mental  workings of  Uggles 
makes  this  claim doubtful. The most we should concede is perhaps that 
µµwe often form a belief or other attitude precisely because our 
antecedent mental states make it rational by, our own lights, for us to 
do.¶¶ For this to be true we need no facts about norms, only, as it were, 
facts about lights, facts about the passions in our souls that our 
distinctively normative judgements express. Likewise Uggle normative 
beliefs are rational by their lights but not by ours. But Uggles, as we 
saw, are not entirely irrational: they are rubbish at the good but OK at 
the true: so they are ethically perverse but not unintelligible. Other still 
weirder creatures, creatures whose epistemic and procedural thought 
was as crazy as Uggles evaluative thought, might not even be 
intelligible as thinking, believing desiring creatures at all. But, pace 
Wedgwood at p. 190, where I think rather too much is concluded from 
an example where we are invited to imagine ourselves very weird 
indeed, that possibility does not defeat the supposition that it is 
rationality by the lights of the interpretee that counts here. It at most 
restricts its application to exclude interpretees of whose thought we can 
make no rational sense of at all. And the horizons of normative 
commonality are far closer than the horizons of normative 
intelligibility. 
A central aspect of WedgwRRG¶V attempt to vindicate the 
credibility of normative intuitions is his invocation of the credibility of 
sensory experience as, in effect, a companion in guilt. Here he invokes 
a notion of primitive rationality,  such that primitively rational  ways 
to  form beliefs are  ways of forming beliefs that  are basically, as 
opposed to independently or antecedently, rational. Of course it would 
be circular to appeal to empirical evidence for the credibility of RQH¶V
sensory experience. But we may nonetheless be warranted in thinking it 
primitively rational to trust such experience. How so? Well, Wedgwood 
suggests, µµ>L@W may be that it is essential to sensory experience that any 
subject who has such experiences has some disposition to have 
experiences that veridically represent certain aspects of her 
environment.¶¶:Hll, yes, perhaps that may be true and it would be 
epistemologically very convenient if it was true but I can¶t, at this point, 
find enough in the way of argument in its support for it to look like 
much more than an optimistic conjecture. 
Rather  more  promisingly  to  my  mind,  Wedgwood also  
suggests  a  possible pragmatic rationale for taking RQH¶V sensory 
experiences at face value: 
 
We could not function as agents at all unless we had some beliefs about 
our immediate  environment. So it  would be unreasonable to  demand  
 that  we should not form any beliefs about our immediate environment 
at all. It would also be unreasonable to demand that we should not form 
beliefs of this kind in any way unless we had independent or antecedent 
reasons for regarding this way of forming beliefs as reliable« In short 
we need to treat some way of forming beliefs about our environment as 
primitively rational; and so it would be unreasonable to expect us to do 
otherwise. (pp. 231±232) 
 
He stresses that this pragmatic rationale only warrants our taking 
some such way of  forming beliefs as  primitively  rational.  It  does 
not recommend  µµWaking our sensory experiences at face value over 
astrology or reading the tea leaves, for example.¶¶ (p. 232) 7KDW¶V 
significant, in part, I guess, because if the pragmatic rationale could 
sustain the latter recommendation, it would make it antecedently 
rational to trust RQH¶V sensory experience and make the invocation of 
primitive rationality unnecessary. 
The status of normative intuitions and sensory experience are, 
he urges, comparable and the invocation of primitive rationality to 
vindicate trust in them comparably credible (p. 246). I doubt this. To 
see why, OHW¶V remind ourselves of some facts about sensory 
experiences. 
First of all, sensory experiences have not one but multiple 
sources. We have not one but several (rather more nowadays I am told 
than the traditional five) sensory modalities that represent the world in 
stable and systematically mutually coherent ways. As well as this 
systematic intrapersonal coherence across my own plural sensory  
modalities,  I  encounter  a  like  systematic  coherence  between  my  
own sensory  experiences  and  the  reported  such  experience  of  other  
people.  These sensory experiences represent to me a world that 
constrains and shapes my agency in predictably stable and recalcitrant 
ways, as I remember whenever I try to walk through walls. But the 
opposite is also true: my agency can shape it in ways that feed back 
into the character of my subsequent sensory experience. When I am 
bothered by the discomfort of feeling hungry, I find I can address the 
problem pretty effectively by trusting my sensory experiences to guide 
me towards food. But ,¶GILQG ,¶P pretty sure (typical armchair-bound 
philosopher, I confess I haven¶t tried), that if I relied here instead on tea 
leaves and the planets ,¶G stay hungry. So I suspect we can take the 
pragmatic rationale considerably further than Wedgwood suggests, 
ruling out teabags and astrology, in which case the rationality of trusting 
our senses is no longer so very obviously so very primitive. (Of course 
the foregoing reasoning might just move the bump elsewhere on the 
carpet leaving us wondering about the rationality, primitive or 
 otherwise, of inductive reasoning. Perhaps there are grounds to treat that 
as primitively rational but that is not a question for another day.) 
The world presented in sensory experience is, moreover, 
systematically orderly in way that allow us to regiment our experience 
of it in the ways that have enabled us to arrive at modern science 
which provides us with a picture, incomplete of course but already 
extraordinarily detailed and powerful, of a lawfully ordered, natural 
world. And this scientific picture of the world that we have constructed 
from our sensory experience is a picture of world in which we and our 
sensory experiences (whose aetiology it describes and explains in some 
detail) are incorporated as a rather small, extremely local, very recently 
evolved part in ways that heavily undermine the thought that it is 
merely something we construct, rather than  something real  and  
objective,  existing  prior  to  and  independently  of  our sensory 
engagement with it. 
The bare epistemic possibility might remain that the world is a 
mere figment engineered by an evil demon or malevolent 
neuroscientist. But, in many ways, I might not much care. It would 
remain the world I inhabit, experientially speaking. The flowers would 
smell no less sweet, the music sound no less enchanting. The world I 
experience would still shape and be shaped by my agency. What might 
matter, for sure, is the reality of other people. But here again pragmatic 
considerations plausibly have considerable bite.4 ,¶G rather risk being 
wrong in supposing you all to be more than merely zombies or virtual 
figments of the evils neuroORJLVW¶VVRIWware than risk being wrong by 
thinking that is all you are. And if that pragmatic warrant is at all 
telling, the pragmatic rationale for trusting our senses is  thereby  still  
further  deepened  and  reinforced.  For  I  can¶t  credit  you  with 
psychological reality unless I take seriously the sensory experience of 
your bodily reality without which I could not identify you as an 
individual at all. 
Compare and contrast. The picture of the natural world 
disclosed by science is a world that incorporates us and our sensory 
experience. It does not, in contrast, at least unless and until we 
supplement science with some distinctly questionable metaphysics, 
incorporate any normative facts at all. And the working of a capacity 
for normative intuition, as Wedgwood characterizes it, is not something 
natural science shows any sign of illuminating or indeed, at least qua 
receptive to a domain of normative facts, detecting. And while, for 
reasons I have gestured at above, I suspect the pragmatic rationale for 
taking sensory experience seriously goes very much deeper than 
Wedgwood allows, there is simply no pragmatic warrant for normative  
realism  or  for  crediting  normative  intuition  with  disclosing to  us  a 
                                                          
4
 Cf. Lenman 1994. 
 domain of normative facts. ,W¶V certainly true that thought and agency 
would be paralysed without normative thought and that such thought 
relies indispensibly on normative intuitions. But when, as we 
expressivists do, we purge both our normative thought and our 
understanding of normative intuition of any realist presuppositions, we 
find that  our normative  life  continues undisturbed. All that  changes 
is  the philosophy and that improves.5 
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